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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIONS
ON POVERTY LAW FIRMS: A NEW YORK
CASE STUDY
MICHAEL BOTEIN*

Government-funded poverty law firms are presently providitzg
essential legal services to poor people throughout the country.
These firms have met with varying responses from the bar and the
courts. In this article, Professor Botein examines the response of
New York's Appellate Division, First Department-a comprehensive
set of regulations governing the practice of law by poverty law
firms. After analyzing these regulations and the constitutional issues
they raise, the author concludes that both procedurally and substantively there is strong doubt concerning their validity.

I
INTRODUCTION

few Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) proTHOUGH
jects have won accolades from local powers-that-be, Legal
Services probably has the distinction of being the most unpopular program around. From its inception, it has been under attack from local legal establishments,! and more recently the
Nixon Administration singled it out as the first OEO program
to be emasculated.2 General questions of federal-state relations
do, of course, figure into this formula for disaster,3 but the prime
lesson of the Legal Services experience may simply be that
poverty lawyers are remarkably effective at attacking previously
sacrosanct local interests. The heat generated by Legal Services
is therefore a tribute to the power of the profession. Unfortunately, the bar's response has not been a gracious acceptance
of Legal Services, but rather an attempt to straitjacket it.
The New York City experience with Legal Services has
been noteworthy-first, because of the city's size and visibility,
and second, because of OEO's huge investment in New York.
Nearly 10% of the total Legal Services budget finds its way

* Ford Urban Law Fellow, Columbia Law School Assistant Professor of
Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., 1966, Wesleyan University. J.D., 1969, Cornell
Law School.
1 Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for
the Poor, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 805, 833-34, 843-44 (1967) [hereinafter Harvard
Note]. See Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), where several
local bar associations sought an injunction against a Legal Services office but
were held to lack standing.
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1970, at 21, col. 4.
3 See, e.g., Nat'! Institute on Fed. Urban Grants: Policies and Procedures,
22 Ad. L. Rev. 113, 114 (1969).
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into the city.4 The Appellate Division, First Department has
reacted to this massive federal commitment by imposing a
variety of restrictions on poverty law firms. An analysis of these
restrictions and their constitutionality may anticipate similar
developments in other jurisdictions.
II
THE' NEW YORK EXPERIENCE

A. Background to Appellate Division Regulation
Poverty law firms must receive Appellate Division approval
in order to practice law in New York.5 In 1966, Community
Action for Legal Services (CALS) petitioned the Appellate
Division, First Department, for such approval. 6 In Matter of
Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., (CALS), the court's
initial reaction was totally negative.7 The court rejected CALS'
petition and indicated by way of dictum its opposition to most
of the proposed innovations, i.e., solicitation,s group representationll and lobbying.10 Though CALS' application was ultimately
approved after extensive modification,l1 the court continued its
4 Office of Economic Opportunity, Evaluation, Community Action For
Legal Services, Inc. 6 (1970) [hereinafter CALS Report].
li N.Y. Judiciary Law § 495 (McKinney 1968) bans the practice of law by
corporations and voluntary associations. An exception is made, however, for
"organizations organized for benevolent or charitable purposes, or for the purpose of assisting persons without means in the pursuit of any civil remedy,
whose existence, organization or incorporation may be approved by the Appellate Division."
6 The application was made to the First Department because the principal
offices of the proposed corporations were to be located in that Department.
Matter of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 356
n.2, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 n.2 (lst Dep't 1966). Two other petitioners joined
with CALS in the action. They were the New York Legal Assistance Corporation and Harlem Assertion of Rights, Inc.
7 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779 (lst Dep't 1966).
sId. at 362-63, 274 N.y.s.2d at 789.
Il Id. at 363.
10 Id. at 362, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 788: "[A]II the proposals are deficient •••
in not prohibiting entirely and without evasive qualification political, lobbying,
and propagandistic activity."
11 Order, Matter of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc. (App. Div.
lst Dep't, Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter CALS Order]. The provisions of the order
were, in several significant aspects, less restrictive than the rules later promulgated. Thus, the rules prescribe extensive procedures concerning application
for and renewal of court approval of the legal corporation's operations (N.Y.
Ct. Rules, App. Div., lst Dep't, Part 608, §§ 608.2, .3 (McKinney 1970) [hereinafter Part 608]) and require extensive annual reports (id. § 608.S)-topics dealt
with only generally in the CALS Order. In addition, the rules add strong curbs on
the dissemination of information (id. § 60S.7(e» and on referrals (id. § 60S.7
(f) ), and dispense with the prerevocation hearing requirement of the CALS
Order (id. § 608.9). The rules are, however, no more stringent than the order,
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regulation by informal means. In what has become known as
.the "Stevens Letter," Presiding Justice Harold A. Stevens made
the court's position still clearer by advising CALS not to sacri"
fice service to individual clients upon the alter of law reform.I :!
In both its initial CALS decision and in later actions the
Appellate Division has reflected an apparent apprehension that
local politicians would take over poverty law firms and run them
with little regard for either efficiency or ethics. Recent history
has, in fact, partially borne these predictions OUt. 13 The court's
concern has led it, however, to paint over these legitimate evils
with a brush far broader than necessary and in a possibly un"
constitutional manner.
In 1970, the Appellate Division promulgated a comprehen"
sive set of regulations governing the practice of law by poverty
law firms.14 The rules represent, in a sense, an expansion and
codification of the court's dictum in CALS!!) in that they severely
limit poverty lawyers' rights regarding solicitation, group repre"
sentation, referrals and lobbying.
A variety of poverty law firms and clients soon challenged
the constitutionality of the rules in Young Lords v. Supreme
Court. 16 The three-judge district court that heard the case
refused to pass on the rules' constitutionality, deeming it a "wise
exercise of discretion" to allow the Appellate Division to con"
fer with the plaintiff law firmsP While the court retained
for example, in restricting civil protest and political activity (id. § 608.8(c»,
limiting representation of organizations and groups rather than individuals (id. §
608.8(b», and defining the membership of boards of directors (id. § 608.6).
The rules may even be more liberal in some areas, such as in the use of law
students as legal counsellors.
12 Letter from Presiding Justice Harold A. Stevens to Community Action
for Legal Services, Inc., Oct. 2, 1969 [hereinafter Stevens Letter] (on file at the
New York University Law Review offices). Though Presiding Justice Stevens appeared to speak as an individual, his letter began by noting that he was writing
"[u]pon direction of the court." Id. at 1.
13 An OED evaluation team found in 1970 that some Legal Services offices
had become dominated by local politicians and had been transformed into sources
of patronage. See CALS Report, supra note 4, at 80.
14 Part 608, supra note 11. While affecting all poverty law offices, the rules
influence most strongly Legal Services offices, since these offices handle the bulk
of all civil poverty law practice in New York City. The rules also apply to
other groups organized "for benevolent or charitable purposes." Id.
15 See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
16 Civil No. 70-5179 (S.D.N.Y., May 19, 1971). The primary assertions of
the complaint were that the rules denied free speech, free association and equal
protection of the laws. Id. at 4.
17 Id. at 7. The court indicated that "[w]e do not reach these arguments
because counsel for defendants has represented that at least partial, and perhaps
full, resolution of the controversy may be accomplished if plaintiff Legal Rights
Organizations apply • . • for approval under Part 608 and for such exceptions
for their activities as they believe are necessary." Id. at 5.
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jurisdiction, it will likely never reach the merits, but rather
will probably follow its current practice of leaving challenges
to the Appellate Division to be resolved informally.18
Running throughout the web of Appellate Division activity
is a distinct thread of participation by the private bar. The
Stevens Letter referred to recommendations by the City Bar
Association's Committee on Professional Responsibility19 and
advised CALS that it could get "more detail" regarding Appellate Division requirements in that committee's report.20 In addition, the rules were formulated in consultation with the Bar
Association's committeej21 they require poverty law firms to
serve copies of their applications on the Associationj 22 and they
are administered with the help of the committee.23 Finally,
counsel for the Appellate Division in Young Lords was one of
the Association members who is responsible for assisting in the
administration of the rules.24
B. Procedural Infirmities of the Rules
Though it might answer some of the federal constitutional
questions surrounding the rules, a decision in Young Lords
would not resolve several collateral procedural points. First, the
Appellate Division's very power to promulgate the rules may be
an unlawful delegation of power. Although the delegation doctrine is now hopefully a dead letter of the law on the federal
level,2u it is still alive and well in the New York courts. The
Appellate Division's enabling legislation26 contains no standards
at all, not even a ritualistic invocation of the "public interest.'127
And, though the New York courts sometimes appear to be
satisfied with ritua1,28 they have been especially sensitive to a
18 Cf. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299
F. Supp. 117 (S.DN.Y. 1969), aff'd, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
10 Stevens Letter, supra note 12, at 1.
20 Id. at 3.
21 See 25 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 466 (1970).
22 Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.2 (copies must also be served on the New
York County Lawyers' Ass'n and the Bronx County Bar Ass'n, inter alia).
23 See 25 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 466 (1970).
2·1 Young Lords v. Supreme Court, Civil No. 70-5179 (S.DN.Y., May 19,
1971).
2[; 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.01 (1958); W. Gellhom &
C. Byse, Administrative Law: Cases and Co=ents 60-61 (5th ed. 1970); L.
Jaffe & N. Nathanson, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials 80-81 (3d ed.
1968).
211 N.Y. Judiciary Law § 495(5) (McKinney 1968).
21 See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.03, at 81-82 (1958).
28 See, e.g., Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 App. Div. 2d 152, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510
(1st Dep't 1968) (standard of "public interest, convenience or necessity" was
not so indefinite as to confer unlimited authority).
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lack of standards where, as here, licenses29 or constitutional
rights SO have been at stake.S1 Moreover, the First Department
has been disturbed by private participation in the administrative
process,S2 a factor whiCh, as noted above, is present in its own
regulation of poverty law firms.
Second, the adoption and administration of the rules may
violate the due process right to notice and a hearing. While the
promulgation of the rules was superficially a quasi-legislative act
requiring no due process safeguards,38 the rules affect only a
29 Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of N.Y., 298 N.Y.
184, 81 N.E.2d 80 (1948); Seignious v. Rice, 273 N.Y. 44, 6 N.E.2d 91 (1936).
30 Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of N.Y., 298 N.Y.
184, 191-92, 81 N.E.2d 80, 83 (1948). The constitutional rights involved in the
instant situation are more compelling than the somewhat tenuous substantive
due process right to attend private schools which the Packer court derived from
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
31 The New York courts have, however, recognized that a seemingly vague
standard may, through custom and practice, acquire a definite meaning. Cherry
v. Board of Regents, 289 N.Y. 148, 44 N.E.2d 405 (1942) ("unprofessional
conduct"); Mandel v. Board of Regents, 250 N.Y. 173, 164 N.E. 895 (1928)
("unfit or incompetent from negligence, habits or other cause" to practice the
profession). The Supreme Court itself has held that "[l]ong usage in New York
and elsewhere has given well-defined contours" to New York's requirement of
good character and fitness for admission to the bar. Law Students Civil Rights
Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1971). But cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1957). Although the courts m.ight thus
be willing to read meaning into a similarly vague standard, the statute at issue
here lacks even this vestige of judicially construable language.
It m.ight also be argued that the provisions of the regulations could be read
by implication into the statute, thus following another time-honored judicial
method of finding standards. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785
(1948). The only problem with this approach is that the regulations themselves
set no standards. While it m.ight be possible to read standards into the regulations by construing the provisions in Part 608, supra note 11, §§ 608-2,-.7,-.8
(relating to reporting requirements and restrictions imposed upon the actions of
poverty law firms), as initial licensing standards, this thrice-removed canon of
construction would presumably be too extreme for even the most sympathetic court.
32 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 34 App. Div. 2d 79, 309 N.y.s.2d 443 (1st
Dep't), rev'd, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 261 N.E.2d 647, 313 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1970). Though
the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, it did recognize that any
significant delegation of adm.inistrative power to private parties was invalid.
33 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.07, at 436 (1958). In Young
Lords v. Supreme Court, Civil No. 70-5179 at 5 (S.D.N.Y., May 19, 1971),
the court said that in promulgating the rules the Appellate Division had been
acting "in a legislative or, as it is now usually phrased, in an administrative
capacity." The court, however, neither raised nor reached the issue of the right
to a hearing. It was concerned solely with whether the rules could be appealed
directly to the New York Court of Appeals. In Law Students Civil Rights
Research Council, Inc. v. WadInond, 401 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1971), however, the
Supreme Court refused to express an opinion as to whether in controlling admission to the bar the Appellate Divisions acted as "courts" or "administrative
agencies." In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1866), the Court
stated that admission to the bar "is not the exercise of a ministerial power. It is
the exercise of judicial power."
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small number of poverty law firms and presumably were aimed
only at them.34 Therefore, in fact if not in form,35 the promulgation of the rules may have been an adjudication, thus requiring both notice and a hearing.s6
Furthermore, the rules themselves provide for little or no
procedural due process upon application for or revocation of
the Appellate Division's approval.37 Due process requires full
notice and a hearing prior to the denial of admission to the
bar,3B and there seems to be no reason to treat a poverty law
firm's right to practice differently. In addition, the New York
courts have been very strict in the analogous area of licensing.
The Court of Appeals has held, for instance, that a driver's
license may not be revoked without a hearing; 39 presumably,
34 The original CALS decision was apparently adjudicatory in nature and
involved the applications of only three groups. Although an agency is, of course,
free to change from adjudication to rulemaking and indeed may be encouraged
to do so, SEC v. ChenerY Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the original mode of
regulation is certainly relevant in characterizing later modes of regulation.
35 Some courts are willing to look beyond form. In American ExportIsbrandtsen Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 389 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), for e.~ple, the court held that an order which invalidated provisions in a large number of longshoremen's contracts amounted to an adjudication.
See also Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948), vacated, 337
U.S. 901 ·(1949). Though the reasoning of these two cases seems sound, it has not
been followed by other courts and has been criticized. See 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.01, at 409-10 (1958).
36 In commenting upon the Appellate Division rules, a committee of the
New York County Lawyers Association noted that, "it would have been desirable for the Appellate Division to have given some form of notice of proposed
rule-making, either formal or informal • • • in advance of the issuance of Part
608." Memorandum from Comm. on Legal Aid to Bd. of Directors, New York
County Lawyers Ass'n at 5 (Jan. 8, 1971) [hereinafter County Lawyers Report]
(on file at the New York University Law Review offices).
37 Part 608 makes no provision at all for notice and a hearing upon application for approval. Two different provisions are applicable to revocation of approval. Part 608, supra note 11, at § 608.4(b), allows revocation for the violation
of any of the conditions and limitations in the Appellate Division's order of
approval "on such notice and after such hearing as the Appellate Division may
deem appropriate." Procedural niceties are thus apparently left entirely up to
the Appellate Division's whim. Section 608.9, on the other hand, provides for
revocation for any other reasons "[u]pon good cause shown ••• on not less
than twenty days' notice," but has no provision for a hearing.
38 Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 108 (1963)
(concurring opinion); Goldsmith v. Board of Ta.~ Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123
(1926). In Willner the Court made the perhaps overly optimistic assumption
that "[c]ertainIy lawyers and courts should be particularly sensitive of, and
have a special obligation to respect, the demands of due process." 373 U.S. at
106.
30 Matter of Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d 728 (1952).
See also People v. Faxlanger, 1 N.Y.2d 393, 135 N.E.2d 70S, 153 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1956) (license to operate gasoline station); English v. Tofany, 32 App. Div.
2d 878, 302 N.Y.S.2d 221 (4th Dep't 1969); Scuiletti v. Sheridan, 12 App. Div.
2d 801, 210 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1961) (taxi license).
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the courts should protect poverty law firms as thoroughly as
automobile drivers.
Thus, the regulations suffer from a variety of procedural
defects. More importantly, however, they impose severe sub·
stantive restrictions upon essential poverty law activitiesrestrictions which may, unfortunately, be emulated by other
jurisdictions.

III
EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

A. Solicitation
The Appellate Division rules severely limit the range of
permissible solicitation by allowing a poverty law firm to dis·
tribute only information which concerns the nature of its ser·
vices and states its economic eligibility requirements.4!)
These rules strike at the lifeblood of any law firm-its
clients. They are especially harsh in light of poor people's igno.
rance of the law and of their need for lawyers. While the middle
class may have some notion of when to consult an attorney, the
poor generally do not.41 In addition, the poor, unlike the middle
class, have little social contact with lawyers. Aggressive education and advertising are therefore necessary in order to make
an impact in their communities.42
In NAACP v. Button, the Supreme Court recognized this
need and cloaked solicitation with first amendment protection.43
In Button, the NAACP organized meetings at which attorneys
encouraged black people to bring desegregation lawsuits. They
also tried to induce participants to become plaintiffs for par·
ticular actions.44 In holding the NAACP's activities to be con40 Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(e), provides:

[A group] formed solely for the purpose of rendering or furnishing legal
services to persons without means, may publish and! or distribute and! or
disseminate information of the nature of the services it is authorized to
render, with an inclusion, however, of a statement of the eligibility and
general qualifications of persons to receive such services.
This subsection is somewhat vague, since it is unclear whether: (1) the
firm must serve only poor people; (2) all clients solicited must be poor; or (3)
both criteria must be met. The language of the provision was, in fact, apparently
added as an afterthought. By comparison, the original CALS Order specifically
gave CALS the power "to inform the public, and in particular the poor of legal
problems, the availability of legal counsel and the basic legal rights of all citizens." CALS Order, supra note 11, at 3.
41 Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex reI. Va. State Bar, 377
U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
42 Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 821-22.
43 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963).
« Id. at 421-22.
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stitutionally protected, the Court sanctioned solicitation far
stronger than that preached or planned by any poverty law
firm.~G In two later cases, the Court went even further and permitted direct personal approaches to potential litigants46-a
technique beyond even the most ambitious community education
project.
In fact, solicitation by a poverty law firm poses far fewer
dangers than the activities involved in Button and later cases.
Since poverty lawyers usually receive a fixed salary, they have
no economic incentive to foment litigation. Moreover, a conflict
between an organization's goals and a client's interests is far
less likely in a poverty law firm than in a case like Button, since
a poverty lawyer is associated with an independent law firm, not
with the organization bringing suit.
Furthermore, restrictions on solicitation are inconsistent
with the current development of professional ethics. The prohibition on advertising originally evolved not as an ethical
principle, but rather as part of the "rules of professional etiquette.,,47 As such, the prohibition has a rather tenuous foundation today, especially when applied to the provision of legal
services to the poor, as both bar and bench have recognized. On
a national level, the American Bar Association has traditionally
sanctioned any advertising necessary to help the poor or vindicate constitutional rights.48 Moreover, OEO encourages solicita~G rd. at 428-29. The Court may have actually meant to protect a narrow
range of activities since it read the Virginia court's decree as prohibiting "any
arrangement by which prospective litigants are advised to seek the assistance of
particular attorneys." rd. at 433 (emphasis added). This reading of the case is,
however, belied by the Court's later more expansive holdings. See note 46 infra.
46 United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 578 (1971) (union
representatives transported potential claimants to the offices of attorneys chosen
by the union); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex reI. Va. State
Bar, 377 U.S. I, 4 (1964) (union representatives visited injured workers and
urged them to retain particular attorneys to prosecute their claims). These
two cases, and United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967), clearly demonstrate that Button cannot be distinguished
as a "civil rights" or "speech" case. "The common thread running through our
decisions in NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United .Mine Workers is that
collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a
fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment." United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of :Mich., supra at 585. To a certain e.,tent the Court
may have been combining first amendment protection with its recent development of a due process and equal protection right of access to the courts. See note
106 infra.
47 H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 211 n.3, 212 (1953).
48 The ABA has allowed newspaper and radio advertisements designed to
inform poor people of their rights and encourage them to seek legal assistance.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 148 (1935); Informal Opinions, No. 992 (1967), No. 786 (1964), No. 764 (1964). See also Fla. Comm,
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tion by Legal Services offices.49 On a local level, the New York
State Bar Association has approved direct mail solicitation of
defendants in eviction proceedings.50 In addition, the courts
have always followed the bar's lead in recognizing the special
needs of poor people with regard to solicitation.51
Thus, broad prohibitions on solicitation by poverty law
firms are probably unconstitutional and certainly not ethically
mandated. Although the possibility that poor people will be
forced into unwanted litigation is a real problem, it can be
resolved by narrowly drawn limitations. Such restrictions, however, must be grounded upon the protection of poor people--not
upon some hypothetical interest of the bar or of the middle
class.52
on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 66-56 (1967), 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT
6100.15, at 7153 (1971); Padnos, Legal Aid and Legal Ethics,S Ga. S.B.J. 347
(1969). In addition, the ABA's new Code of Professional Responsibility codifies
the bar's historical commitment by expressly exempting poverty law firms from
its general ban on solicitation. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility D-R
2-103(D) (1969). In fact, the drafters of the code seem to have attempted to
incorporate constitutional standards by reference, since D-R 2-103 (D) (5) n.123
explicitly refers to NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), Brotherhood of RR
Trainmen v. Virginia ex reI. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), and United Mine
Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
49 Office of Economic Opportunity, How to Apply For a Legal Services
Program, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. II 6705.50, at 7730-32 (1968). See also Note,
Beyond the Neighborhood Offices-OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services, 56
Geo. L.J. 742, 750 (1968). The National Legal Aid and Defender Association,
another organization with experience and expertise in poverty law, also encourages extensive co=unity education. NLADA, Handbook of Standards for
Legal Aid and Defender Offices 14 (1970). OEO's encouragement of solicitation
also raises questions of preemption. See text accompanying notes 108-116 infra.
50 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 75
(1968),23 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 374 (1968). See also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Co=.
on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 71 (1968), in which the committee authorized
distribution of pamphlets which portrayed aspects of the law important to the
poor.
Most recently and dramatically, the District of Columbia Bar Association
approved full-page newspaper advertisements in which the Stem Community
Law Firm, a private "public interest" organization, listed toys which the Food
and Drug Administration had found to be defective and urged consumers to
assert their right to return the toys. The advertisement suggested that consumers
contact the law firm if their dealer refused a refund. D.C. Co=. on Legal Ethics
and Grievance, Report (1971) (on file at the New York University Law Review
offices) .
51 See, e.g., In Re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934); Stanislaus County
Bar Ass'n v. California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT
6100.05, at 7152 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1967); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 19l Ga.
366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940); Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 432 S.W.2d
690 (Tex. 1968). In fact, even the Virginia court reversed by Button held that
solicitation was entitled to some, albeit limited, first amendment protection.
NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960).
52 See note 118 infra.
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B. Group Representation
Group representation is an essential poverty law too1.53 It
is not only an effective means of making contact with the community, but is also the only feasible way to secure relief in many
situations, e.g., a rent strike. In addition, poverty law firms'
limited resources often make individual representation merely
a gesture and group representation a necessity in order to meaningfully help the community.54
The Appellate Division's rules on group representation
seem to have been motivated largely by a fear that poverty law
firms would take cases with controversial political, social and
economic issues.m; The rules begin with an outright ban on group
representation,u6 but make an exception for "legal services rendered to groups or organizations of persons primarily for the
purpose of promoting the interests of persons eligible as indigent
individuals."u7 This proviso is obviously somewhat ambiguous,
but it appears to allow a firm to represent only groups whose
membership is primarily indigent.
Such a limitation encroaches upon the constitutional right of
association. us This right, upheld in Button as regards the
NAACP, applies equally as well to groups which seek representation by a poverty law firm. Freedom of association would be
meaningless in many cases if groups were denied such representation. First, an organization often needs an attorney to effectuate its beliefs and goals; second, lack of money or espousal
of unpopular causes will often deprive such groups of any counsel other than poverty lawyers. The right to such representation
is not limited to the indigent. In Button and in two later
cases involving unionized workers,59 the Supreme Court specifiSee Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 817-18.
See CALS Report, supra note 4, at 20.
55 In Matter of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div.
2d 354, 363, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 789 (1st Dep't 1966), the court noted that "mt
would be one thing to allow neighborhood law offices to handle poor men's
credit unions. It would be quite another to have them handle, advise, and
represent political factions or organizations of social and economic protest, however worthy."
56 "Except as may be specifically authorized by order of the Appellate
Division, no corporation, association or organization shall be entitled to procure
or furnish legal services to another corporation, association or organization."
Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(b).
57Id.
58 "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of belieis and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." NAACP v. Alabama
ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
50 See note 46 supra.
53

54
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cally allowed representation of nonindigent individuals. The
rules' limitation on group representation therefore amounts to
an unconstitutional interference with many organizations' freedom of expression and association.
As with solicitation, the restrictions on group representation are not only unconstitutional, but they are also inconsistent
with contemporary legal ethics. Even the leading authority on
legal ethics can find no rational basis for the prohibition of
group representation. 60 In addition, both the bar61 and the
courts 62 have traditionally allowed group representation of individuals with common interests. Perhaps even more importantly, OEO views group representation as an integral part of
Legal Services63 and specifically requires CALS to give it priority.64
Thus, by limiting group representation the Appellate Division has imposed unconstitutional restrictions. If the court's
purpose in promulgating these restrictive rules is to prevent
poor people from becoming the ideological pawns of poverty
lawyers, the court can assert its traditional disciplinary powers
over individual attorneys without posing issues of constitutional
magnitude.
Coupled with the restrictions on group representation is a
requirement that poverty law firms refer cases only through
H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 163-64 (1953).
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 111 (1934). The ABA
has, however, consistently prohibited plans calling for representation of an
organization's members. E.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No.
56 (1931), No.8 (1925).
62 See, e.g., Royal Oak Drain Dist. v. Keefe, 87 F.2d 786 (6th Cir. 1937);
Davies v. Stowell, 78 Wis. 334, 47 N.W. 370 (1890).
63 OEO, Guidelines for Legal Services Programs, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT
6700.35, at 7702 (196S).
64, OEO's grant to CALS requires that its offices undertake group representation. OEO, Special Conditions Applicable to CALS and All Delegate and
Affiliated Corporations § 3.16 (1971) [hereinafter OEO Special Conditions] (on
file at the New York University Law Review offices). Under the OEO eligibility
requirements, a Legal Services office may represent nonprofit unincorporated
associations if the majority of members are poor and if the group as an entity
does not have the funds required for private representation. Nonprofit corporations are eligible if the corporation cannot borrow funds and does not have
sufficient income to pay for private representation, and if most of the members
are poor and the group's primary goal is to alleviate significant poverty problems. Such a corporation would also be eligible if "assertion of the particular
legal principle at issue bears substantial significance to the achievement of justice
for poor people generally." rd. § 3.1(2)-(3). See also CALS Report, supra
note 4, at 30-31, which states that a rule preferable to Part 60S, supra note 11,
§ 60S.7(b), "would be one which makes a group eligible if it lacks money in its
treasury to hire a lawyer, or if private lawyers have refused to represent the
group or if the group seeks representation on an issue of wide significance to
the poor." (emphasis added).
60
61

Imaged with the Permission of N. y.u. Law Review

October 1971]

POVERTY LAW FIRMS

759

conventional channels.65 Any commercial lawyer, of course, is
very protective of his right to refer-and be referred-cases at
bar association functions. Poverty lawyers have an even greater
need for selective referral, however, since some of their clients
receive unsympathetic treatment from attorneys with conflicting
ideologies. 66 Both Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 'V. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar67 and United Transportation
Union 'V. State Bar of Michigan68 recognized this problem and
upheld systems of highly selective referral; even Mr. Justice
Harlan, who dissented in Button and subsequent cases, would
have probably given the system his stamp of approval. 69 Moreover, OEO requires merely that Legal Services units "consider"
using conventional referral systems, but leaves them free to adopt
their own methods where they feel existing ones are "inadequate.'no

C. Lobbying
Lobbying is an essential function of the poverty lawyer,
since it is often a far more effective means of changing the law
than test cases.71 Legal Services has always emphasized law reform as a high-priority component of its overall program,72 and
naturally, lobbying is an integral part of this commitment. Thus,
OEO specifically authorizes CALS to engage in law reform, including "legislative activities."73 Furthermore, the American
or; Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(f).
See generally Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 13 (1952).
377 U.S. 1 (1964).
401 U.S. 576 (1971).
See United :Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. DIinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
217, 228-30 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
70 OEO, Guidelines for Legal Services Programs, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT
6700.35, at 7702 (1968). See also Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 432
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968).
71 Salisch, Reform Through Legislative Action: The Poor and the Law, 13
St. Louis UL.J. 373 (1969).
72 Reco=endations of Project Advisory Group of Legal Services Program
on Nat'l Strategy for Law Reform, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT 6010, at 7033
(1968); Memorandum from Earl Johnson, (former) Director, Legal Services
Program of OEO, to Board of Directors and Staff of Co=unity Action Agencies
and Legal Services Agencies, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT 6010, at 7032 (1968);
Johnson, Professional Responsibility Aspects of Legal Services Programs, 41 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 319, 324-25 (1969); Note, Beyond the Neighborhood OfficeOEO's Special Grants in Legal Services, supra note 49, at 756-57.
73 OEO Special Conditions, supra note 64, § 4.2 (1971). See also CALS
Report, supra note 4, at 31, which states that Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(c),
in prohibiting lobbying and propagandistic activities is "more restrictive than
current OEO guidelines," even though it allows testimony to be given at legislative hearings.
66
67
6S
69
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Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility allows
lawyers to lobby for their clients.74
Nevertheless, in its initial CALS decision, the Appellate Division opposed lobbying by poverty law firms.75 This dictum subsequently took on concrete form in the rules' prohibition against
"any political, lobbying, or propagandistic activities" by poverty
law firms. 76
While the Supreme Court has never squarely held that
lobbying comes within the first amendment, it has always
granted lobbying a measure of protection. In both United States
v. Rumely77 and United States v. Harriss,78 the Court, in order
to avoid constitutional questions, essentially rewrote federal
legislation involving lobbying.79 The Court might be less willing
to go to these lengths today, however, since Harriss relied in
part on an analogy to criminal libel statutes80-an analogy effectively destroyed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 81 In addition, the Appellate Division's rules are considerably more
restrictive than the legislation involved in Rumely and Harriss. 82
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-16 (1969).
See note 10 supra.
Part 608, supra note 11, § 608.7(c). See text accompanying note 85 infra
for the exception to this prohibition. The rules also prohibit poverty lawyers
from organizing "protest or civil disobedience groups or social movements." These
prohibitions apply to attorneys employed by the applicable groups both when
they act on behalf of the group and when they act on behalf of any other
person or group.
77 345 U.S. 41 (1953). Rumely involved a prosecution for contempt of Congress for failure to disclose, pursuant to a resolution, information relating to
certain "lobbying" activities.
78 347 U.S. 612 (1954). Harriss involved a prosecution, pursuant to the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1964), for failure to
register as a lobbyist and to disclose lobbying activities and support. By its
terms, the act applied to anyone paid "to aid . . . (a) The passage or defeat of
any legislation by the Congress of the United States. (b) To influence, directly
or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the
United States." 2 U.S.C. § 266 (1964).
79 In Rumely, the Court construed "lobbying" to mean "representations
made directly to the Congress, its members, or its committees." 345 U.S. at 47,
quoting the lower court opinion, 197 F.2d 166, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In Harriss
the Court rephrased the test slightly as "direct communication with members
of Congress on pending or proposed federal legislation." 347 U.S. at 620. In
both cases, the Court said that its construction was necessary to avoid a violation
of the first amendment. 345 U.S. at 46-47; 347 U.S. at 625-26.
80 347 U.S. at 626.
81 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964). Though New York Times involved a civil
libel action, its principle was, of course, immediately extended to criminal libel
in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
82 See NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 524-25 (E.D. Va. 1958), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), which
held unconstitutional a Virginia lobbying registration statute encompassing anyone who promoted or opposed legislation "in any manner" on the ground that it
was more restrictive in limiting free speech than the federal statute as interpreted in Harriss.
74

75
76

Imaged with the Permission of N. y.u. Law Review

October 1971]

POVERTY LAW FIRMS

761

They do not merely require the registration of lobbyists and the
disclosure of their activities, but instead they forbid lobbying
absolutely.s3 Moreover, in Harriss the Court gave consideration
to Congress' need to know the sources of "pressures" directed at
itS4-a need obviously not shared by the Appellate Division.
Although a proviso to the rules-presumably inserted out
of deference to Rumely and Harriss-allows poverty lawyers,
with the permission of the Appellate Division, to "suggest, testify,
comment on, review and interpret legislation,"85 the permitted
activity falls far short of the lobbying sanctioned in Rumely and
Harriss. Upholding the rules' restriction on lobbying would thus
require judicial surgery far more drastic than that performed
in Rumely and Harriss.
Furthermore, by prohibiting lobbying, the Appellate Division has prevented poverty lawyers from exercising their right,
as members of the bar, to criticize the law.86 The Appellate
Division's fear of lobbying by poverty lawyers is hard to understand, especially since commercial lawyers regard lobbying as
such an integral part of their profession.87 The potential evils
of lobbying do not justify a blanket ban, but instead can be
effectively dealt with through existing state and federallaw. 88

D. Disclosure
The Appellate Division's rules require a poverty law firm
to submit an annual report disclosing an extremely broad spectrum of information, including its activities,89 the names and
addresses of all employees,90 and the principal objectives of any
group represented. 91
The requirement of identifying all employees is the most
83 In addition, "political and propagandistic" activities are absolutely proscribed. Part 60S, supra note 11, § 60S.7(c) , Cf. Seasongood v. Commissioner,
227 F.2d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1955), "mf all address to the public or to authority
is to be condemned because [it is] propaganda, the right of petition . . . becomes meaningless. So, also, with the constitutionally protected right of free
speech."
84 347 U.S. at 625.
85 Part 60S, supra note 11, § 60S.7(c).
86 In Re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 631 (1959); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353
U.S. 252, 273 (1957).
87 Cf. County Lawyers Report, supra note 36, at 2.
88 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 262-70 (1964); cf. N.Y. Election Law § 460 (McKinney
1970).
Sll Part 60S, supra note 11, § 6.0S.S(f),
30 Id. § 60S.8 (c) •
91 Id. § 60S.S (g). This subsection requires the disclosure of activities inVolving "the advocacy or representation of a group of persons in connection with
social, economic, civil rights, reform or group programs, movements, goals or
protests," but includes a proviso preserving "the anonymities of the individuals
involved."
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objectionable.92 It immediately runs afoul of the cases in which
the Supreme Court has struck down efforts to obtain NAACP
membership lists as violative of the rights of free speech and
free association.93 As the Court is well aware, publicly identifying the members of an unpopular organization not only stigmatizes the individuals, but also inhibits the organization's ability
to attract support.94 Although lawyers are presumably hardier
than laymen and the bar is supposedly more tolerant than lay
groups, the young lawyer cannot fail to be influenced by the attitudes of his contemporaries. Moreover, law students-often
employed by poverty law firms-must anticipate their appearance before the Committee on Character and Fitness.95
Furthermore, the Appellate Division seems to have no real
need for disclosure. It certainly lacks any of the traditional
justifications, i.e., possible violence/a Communist infiltration91
or fraudulent practices.9S Indeed, the court already possesses
much of the information sought; like all other lawyers, poverty
lawyers must file notices of appearance and, more importantly,
must pass the scrutiny of the Committee on Character and Fitness. Thus, the rules create a type of "double admittance" re92 Although the required disclosure of the firm's activities certainly seems
unnecessary and burdensome, see County Lawyers Report, supra note 36, at 4,
it probably does not present problems of great constitutional magnitude as long
as it is restricted to requiring fairly general information. Interpreting it more
expansively to require disclosure of a firm's specific activities, however, would
run afoul of the same first amendment bans that limit the other disclosure
provisions. See text accompanying notes 93-102 infra.
93 See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Co=., 372 U.S. 539
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); cf.
Louisiana ex re!. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). The ordinance in
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), had a provision very similar to
§ 608.8(c)'s required disclosure of all attorneys. The ordinance there pro\ided
that all organizations within the city "list with the City Clerk ••. [t]he officers,
agents, servants, employees or representatives of such organization, and the
salaries paid to them." Bates v. Little Rock, supra at 518-19 n.3. A list of those
paying dues was also required. The Court found that compelling disclosure of
membership lists was violative of the right of free association. It did not, however, discuss the required disclosure of officers and employees. It might, of
course, be argued that these cases are distinguishable from the Appellate Dhision
requirements in that they involved membership as opposed to employee lists.
Nevertheless, this appears to be a distinction without significance since an organization can be straitjacketed by public identification of its employees just as
well as by public identification of its members.
94 NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
95 See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401
U.S. 154, 185 (1971) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
96 NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465-66 (1958); New
York ex reI. Bryant v. Zi=erman, 278 U.S. 63, 75-77 (1928).
91 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Co=., 372 U.S. 539, 546-48
(1963).
9S NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958).
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quirement, which the Supreme Court recently seems to be
frowning upon.99
The rules also require a poverty law firm to submit as part
of its annual report copies of any publication distributed to
twenty-five or more persons and a statement of the nature and
extent of the distribution.loo This requirement is also constitutionally questionable for reasons akin to those applicable to the
identification provisions. In Talley v. California/ol the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance which required that all pamphlets identify the publisher. The Court held that such a requirement restricted the freedom to distribute information and
therefore the freedom of expression.l02 The Appellate Division's
rule is even more inhibiting since it requires not only disclosure
of the publisher's identity but also submission of the publication
to the licensing authority-once again with no guarantee of secrecy. The rules, in fact, do not provide for the confidentiality
of these annual reports.
Equal Protection of Lawyers
Any self-respecting Wall Street lawyer would, quite naturally, be outraged if suddenly ordered not to represent corporations, not to refer cases to his friends and, in addition, to give
the Appellate Division a blow-by-blow description of his internal office workings. This is, of course, exactly what the
Appellate Division requires poverty lawyers to do. As articulated
in the original CALS decision, the court's rationale seems to be
that the corporate practice of law demands special safeguards.los
Unfortunately, history has overtaken this traditional analysis.
New York's Business Corporation Law now permits commerciallaw firms to incorporate, and the Appellate Division has not
yet subjected these firms to regulation.104, As a result, the ApE.

90 See In Re
100 Part 608,
101 362 U.S.

Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 29 (1971).
supra note 11, § 608.8(i).
60 (1960). The Talley principle is, in fact, closely related to
that of the membership list cases, note 93 supra, as witnessed by the Talley
Court's citation of Alabama and Bates as analogous cases. Id. at 65.
102 Id. at 64.
103 In Matter of Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div.
2d 354, 356, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (1st Dep't 1966), the court noted that "the
allowable practice of law by corporations is highly exceptional, permissible only
in carefully circumscribed conditions consonant with the policy of limiting the
practice of law to licensed professionals."
104 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1503(e) (McKinney Supp. 1970) states that "[a]
corporation authorized to practice law shall be subject to the regulation and
control of, and its certificate of incorporation shall be subject to suspension,
revocation or annulment for cause by, the appellate division of the supreme
court and the court of appeals in the same manner and to the same extent
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pellate Division's special treatment of poverty law firms now
can rest only upon the nature of the firms and their clientele.
Any classification based upon poverty, however, is at least
"suspect" and perhaps even "forbidden,'Ho5 thus bringing it
within the equal protection clause. Even if the rules' classification is not inherently invalid, it is invidious in its effect, since it
interferes with poor people's right of access to the courts-a
right which the Supreme Court has recently begun to recognize.10G
In fact, the Fifth Circuit recently applied an equal protection analysis to a closely related issue. In Trister v. University
of Mississippi,t°7 the court held that equal protection prohibited
the university from firing two law professors because of their
participation in a Legal Services program. If a law school is
barred from discriminating against poverty lawyers, the Appellate Division presumably is also.
F. Federal Preemption
The courts might understandably want to avoid either going into "the business of supervising the practice of law in the
various statesnl08 or dealing with the far-reaching constitutional
issues that the Appellate Division's rules raise. However, they
need not go so far. The courts could invalidate the rules-or at
least their application to CALS-on the less controversial
provided in the judiciary law with respect to individual attorneys and counselorsat-law." The Appellate Division has not exercised the power that this statute
apparently has given it to regulate corporations authorized to practice law.
105 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). The
terms are those of Tussman and TenBrock.. See Tussman & TenBrock, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 353-56 (1949).
106 E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.s. 353 (1963); Griffin v. lllinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956). The exact constitutional source of this right is somewhat hazy.
Initially, the Court seemed to base it upon a conception of equal protection. (In
Griffin, while the plurality spoke in terms of "[b]oth equal protection and due
process," id. at 17, the holding must be viewed as based on equal protection
alone, since Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who cast the deciding vote, spoke solely in
terms of equal protection. Id. at 21-22. Ten years later, however, the Court
treated Griffin as having been decided under both provisions. Rinaldi v. Yeager,
384 U.S. 305 (1966).) More recently the Court again shifted the right of access
to the courts, this time to the manageable confines of the due process clause. In
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), it was held that a state divorce
filing fee violated due process by inhibiting access to the courts. \Vhatevcr the
basis for the right, state action which colorably violates due process is sufficiently
invidious to violate equal protection. See generally Note, Discriminations
Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 435, 438
(1967).
107 420 F.2d 499, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1969).
108 United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. lllinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,
234 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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grounds of preemption,l°9 since federal administrative regulations are supreme over state law.110 The Supreme Court has, in
fact, in an analogous area, indicated that a state may not restrict the activities of a federally licensed attorney.1ll
OEO's general guidelines,1l2 the specific CALS requirements1l3 and CALS' explicit authority to supervise its attorneys'
ethics,114 should thus preempt the Appellate Division's rules.
The only rub with preemption, however, is simply that OEO has
never come out and said that it intends to preempt state rules.1l5
As a result, the courts would have to engage in a bit of judicial
telepathy-an art which they have not been loathe to practice in
the past.llll

IV
CONCLUSION

Mr. Justice Harlan has commented, perhaps by way of
understatement, that "the organized bar may be thought to have
been too slow in recognizing" poor people's need for legal services.ll7 The remedy, however, is not to be found in the Appellate Division's restrictions, despite the court's well-intentioned
attempts to protect the public.1l8 The poor need protection from
the private attorneys who make the law a tool of oppression, not
from the poverty lawyers who are beginning to reverse the bal109 Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 208 (1959). The very few privately funded poverty
law firms would, of course, not receive the benefit of preemption, since OEO's
policy and rules are not applicable to them.
110 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1963).
111 In Sperry v. Florida ex ret Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), the Court
stated that a local bar association could not prohibit from practicing patent
law a nonlawyer practitioner authorized to practice before the Commissioner
of Patents but not admitted by the state. Accord, Silverman v. State Bar, 405
F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1968).
112 OEO, Guidelines for Legal Services Programs, 1 CCH Poverty L. Rep. IT
6700.35 (1968).
113 OEO Special Conditions, supra note 64.

lH

rd.

§ 2.1.

For a critique of OEO's general failure to lay down clear and affirmative
guidelines, see Hannon, National Policy Versus Local Control: The Legal Services
Dilemma,S Calif. WL. Rev. 223 (1969).
116 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
117 United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 599 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring and dissenting).
118 In Matter of Co=unity Actions for Legal Services, Inc., 26 App. Div.
2d 354, 356, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (1st Dep't 1966), the court said that restrictions on poverty law firms "are justifiable only as protective of the public • •
not for the economic preservation of the Bar."
115
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ance of legal power. Though there must, of course, be professional ethics for poverty lawyers, these ethics must reflect
pragmatic problems-not figments of the judicial imagination.1l9
Unfortunately, both bench and bar have yet to leave the comforts of their marbled halls and face the realities of the street.
119 The Committee on Legal Aid of the County Lawyers Association somewhat politely noted that it has been "handicapped by a lack of information as
to the precise nature of the problems faced by the Appellate Division which gave
rise to the issuance of Part 608." County Lawyers Report, supra note 36, at 5.
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